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Responsibility Modelling for Risk Analysis
Russell Lock, Tim Storer, Ian Sommerville & Gordon Baxter
School of Computer Science, University of St Andrews, United Kingdom
This paper proposes a novel approach to systems modelling based on responsibilities. The approach is designed
to help users identify and analyse the hazards and associated risks that can arise in complex socio-technical
systems that span organisational boundaries. Through a case study this paper shows how the technique can
identify the vulnerabilities that may arise because human, organisational or technological agents fail to discharge
the responsibilities assigned to them.
1 INTRODUCTION
Existing risk analysis techniques commonly focus on
the interaction of technical aspects of systems. How-
ever, we argue that within complex systems socio-
technical factors, including the interaction of people
with technical components, and the effect of the en-
vironment on those interactions provides a different
perspective on the risks associated with a system. This
view is especially relevant to safety and mission criti-
cal systems, where significant consideration is needed
to the risks associated with system change and evolu-
tion.
For example, elections are considered mission crit-
ical to the government, which is bound by law to con-
duct them at set periods. They are also mission critical
to the councils which are bound to collect and collate
ballots to acceptable levels of accuracy to the pop-
ulace. Both can involve significant amounts of tech-
nology, but it is the risks of the technology combined
with the level of training, and the capabilities of the
staff involved that influence the success of any given
election process.
We believe Responsibilities are a natural form of
expression for risk analysis within complex socio-
technical systems. We have developed the technique
of responsibility modelling, an approach which al-
lows stakeholders to explore the hazards and associ-
ated risks of a given system in a structured and logical
manner. These models can then be used to mitigate
or avoid the risks associated with misunderstandings,
and provide support for the analysis of potential pro-
cess change.
This paper puts forward an approach which aug-
ments responsibility modelling with additional hazard
and risk data. We argue that this technique is useful in
both the design of new systems and in the analysis,
evolution and reassessment of existing systems. The
modelling process is one of collaborative working, in
that several stakeholders, perhaps not co-located, use
the technique to build and analyse responsibility mod-
els augmented with additional risk data. Dependent
on the domain the stakeholders could be developers,
managers, end-users or any stakeholders who have a
need to understand and reach a collaborative agree-
ment on either the way a system needs to work, or the
way in which it already does.
We have developed tools to provide both a stand
alone, and a web based version of the responsibility
modelling. These allow multiple users to work col-
laboratively on editing and analysing a given model.
Our tools provide a complete graphical environment
to support the description and modification of key-
words attached to responsibility model entities and
relationships. We support the ability to compare mod-
els of the same responsibilities, in a ‘before and af-
ter’ style which allows users to benefit from system
overviews that can be used to easily identify funda-
mental changes in a visual and more usable format
than written documentation alone.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section
2 provides background on responsibility modelling.
Section 3 reviews prominent risk / hazard modelling
techniques. Section 4 explains how we have extended
responsibility modelling to encompass the benefits of
these techniques. Section 5 provides an overview of
our work on evaluating the technique using a case
study based on the Scottish Elections in 2007. Finally,
section 6 outlines future work in this area and draws
conclusions.
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2 RESPONSIBILITY MODELLING BACK-
GROUND
Responsibility modelling has been proposed by sev-
eral authors as a useful construct for analysing the
dependability of socio-technical systems (Blyth et al.
1993; Dobson and Sommerville 2005; Strens and
Dobson 1993). In addition to achieving system goals,
both social and technical entities contribute to the
broader dependability of a system. The notion that hu-
man agents in a system, if employed appropriately,
can contribute positively to the dependability of a
technical system is one that is often missed in discus-
sions of software dependability (Besnard and Baxter
2003; Besnard and Greathead 2003).
For our purposes, we define a responsibility as:
A duty, held by some agent, to achieve,
maintain or avoid some given state, subject
to conformance with organisational, social
and cultural norms.
The term ‘duty’ in this context refers to more than
simply a statement that a given task should be com-
pleted. It also encompasses aspects of accountability.
The phrase organisational, social and cultural norms
relates to the inherent nature of responsibilities; that
systems are adapted to fit the culture they operate in,
that processes have to work within the social frame-
work of both legal and domain standards. Responsi-
bilities are rarely broken down to individual instruc-
tions, as they represent higher level constructs encom-
passing a remit for initiative. Initiative is bounded by
professional conduct, from an organisational perspec-
tive as well as the wider social and cultural ones.
We use responsibilities within a graphical mod-
elling environment that encompasses Responsibil-
ities, Agents and Resources, connected by rela-
tionships. The following sections only provide an
overview of the responsibility modelling technique,
focusing instead on the addition of Hazard Analysis.
For more information on Responsibility modelling in
general we recommend reading (Lock et al. 2009).
Graphical models of responsibility were first pro-
posed in the ORDIT methodology (Blyth et al. 1993),
a notation for describing the responsibilities that
agents hold with respect to one another. Strens, Dob-
son and Sommerville have argued for the impor-
tance of analysing responsibility and the need to view
roles with respect to the responsibility relationships
that exist between them (Dobson 1993; Dobson and
Sommerville 2005; Strens and Dobson 1993). Dews-
bury and Dobson (Dewsbury and Dobson 2007) de-
scribe much of the research undertaken on responsi-
bility as part of the DIRC project 1, presenting analy-
sis of inappropriate responsibility allocation in socio-
technical systems.
1http://www.dirc.ac.uk
Similar in intent, goal based modelling approaches,
such as i* and KAOS are intended to expose high
level dependencies between objectives in a given sys-
tem (Darimont et al. 1997; Yu 2002). Goals can be
hierarchical and achieved through the fulfillment of
some or all sub-goals.
Despite some similarities, responsibility modelling
differs from goal based techniques. Whilst the notion
of responsibility modelling may be viewed as incor-
porating the specification of objectives to be achieved,
there is also an acknowledgment that in complex
socio-technical systems, the achievement of an objec-
tive (i.e. the discharge of responsibility) is subject to
a range of constraints and that even with the best ef-
forts of an agent, a goal may not be achieved. These
constraints are difficult to explore and model using
a goal-based approach which focuses principally on
what has to be achieved.
In contrast to goal-based approaches, there are cir-
cumstances in which an authority may judge that a
responsibility has been appropriately discharged, de-
spite the fact that a associated goal has not been
achieved. Woods (Woods 2005) has noted (in the
context of accountability and learning in health care
organisations) how actors are required to cooper-
ate with regard to individual responsibilities in order
for broader organisational responsibilities to be dis-
charged. The notion of responsibility embodies an as-
sumption that it is how an agent acts and not just what
is achieved that is important. For example, a doctor
who has carried out the correct procedures may have
successfully discharged their responsibility for patient
care, even though a patient dies.
For the purposes of this paper the entities and rela-
tionships we are dealing with are outlined in Figure 1
and match the key below:
Responsibility: A stated activity or abstract concept
Information Resource: For example a report or
database
Physical Resource: For example a piece of equip-
ment
Human Agent: For example, an election clerk
Organisational Agent: For example the govern-
ment
Responsible For: The allocation of an agent to a re-
sponsibility
Has: The allocation of resources to agents or respon-
sibilities
Subordinate To: To model organisational hierar-
chies
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Figure 1: Responsibility Modeling Key
Acts As: For example Bob acts as an election clerk
Association: Used to annotate models with relation-
ships of a domain specific type. These could be
anything for example, for example to show A
cannot occur at the same time as B.
3 RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
This section discusses two prominent risk analysis
techniques that use keywords to guide analysis. In
building a responsibility modelling technique for risk
analysis we build upon many of the concepts de-
scribed here.
HAZOPS (Kletz 1999) is a goal driven method
originally developed by ICI for the chemical indus-
try. It focuses on the identification of potential haz-
ards using keywords and associated risks through in-
depth descriptions of the system in question, with
a focus on technical operability and efficiency. HA-
ZOPS keywords are used to construct tables examin-
ing the effect of deviation from the norm for a given
process. For example: given a specific deviation for a
given process, (something occurring early, late, never,
in reverse, to much etc); what are the consequences;
what actions could be taken to mitigate the conse-
quences; what safeguards could be put in place; what
is the risk of the occurrence of the deviation etc. HA-
ZOPS is applied predominantly at the mechanical,
rather than socio-technical systems level. The HA-
ZOPS approach is a recognition that the use of codes
of practice and standards can only partly eliminate the
risks associated with the implementation of systems,
and that many failures are anticipatable and avoidable
given appropriate contingency planning.
The key benefits of the HAZOPS approach include;
• The promotion of systematic understanding of
all processes and resources within the system,
and examination of the environment in which the
system operates. This in turn can be used to find
and evaluate hazards and ameliorate risks asso-
ciated with operation of the system.
• By examining the consequences of different sce-
narios in a systematic manner it is possible to de-
termine the effect of failures on other parts of a
given system.
• HAZOPS has a demonstrable effect (Pully 2004)
in reducing the number of ‘snagging’ issues dur-
ing the running-in of complex technical systems.
HAZOPS is, however, not suitable for the wider
socio-technical system domain due to its reliance on
completeness, and focus on low level technical activ-
ity sequences. This prevents HAZOPS from analysing
human behaviour, and also makes it too complex a
technique to be used without considerable effort on
the part of investigators.
A number of software tools for HAZOPS have
been developed (eg:Dyadem2) but these are targeted
at chemical applications and are not available on an
open source basis.
Hollnagel’s Cognitive Reliability and Error Analy-
sis Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel 1998) is described
as a second generation human reliability analysis
method, because it unifies best practice from the fields
of human reliability and the cognitive sciences. The
former is often more concerned with predicting hu-
man behaviour, usually in a quantifiable way, whilst
the latter is more concerned with understanding and
explaining human behaviour with a view to being able
to predict it under given circumstances. CREAM can
be used retrospectively to analyse the possible causes
of an accident that has happened, or prospectively to
identify the possible failures that could lead to acci-
dents. In CREAM performance takes place in a con-
text defined by the interaction between three high
level factors: the human operator; the technology; the
wider organisation (including the physical environ-
ment in which the system is located). CREAM cate-
gorises erroneous actions using a small set of possible
error modes or effects (Hollnagel calls them logical
phenotypes): timing, duration, force, distance, speed,
direction, object and sequence, each of which can
manifest itself in only a few ways. So, for example,
within the timing category, an action can be erroneous
because it is too early, too late, or omitted.
CREAM can be applied to socio-technical do-
mains, however it relies on sets of predefined crite-
ria and types which have to be followed rigorously to
achieve results. Again, the role of CREAM investiga-
tor is not one that can be carried out without signifi-
cant training. As with HAZOPS, there is a lack of tool
support to ease the introduction of CREAM to a wider
audience.
2http://www.dyadem.com/products/phapro/
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4 AUGMENTING RESPONSIBILITY MOD-
ELLING FOR RISK ANALYSIS
We provide coverage for both entity and relationship
types in what we term ‘risk clauses’. These outline
the entity involved, its associated hazards and context,
combined with the risk of occurrence and severity.
More specifically a risk clause defines the following
data:
Target The entity / relationship to which the clause
refers. For example the entity in question could
be a responsibility, or a resource expected to be
used. A relationship could include the allocation
of a resource to a group for use in a situation.
Hazard Using a restricted set of keywords we aim
to focus discussions by giving a clear checklist
of hazard categories to consider. The hazard key-
words we use are adapted from HAZOPS and are
outlined below:
• Early Occurrence of the entity/relationship
before required
• Late Occurrence of the entity/relationship
after required
• Never Non-occurrence of the en-
tity/relationship
• Incapable If the occurrence of the en-
tity/relationship could not take place even
though planned
• Insufficient Occurrence of the en-
tity/relationship at an incorrect level
• Impaired Occurrence of the en-
tity/relationship in an incorrect manner
Condition The potential conditions that could arise
with relation to the hazard occurring. Where
multiple conditions exist, these should be sepa-
rated out for individual consideration.
Risk We define risk in this context as a combination
of the probability of the hazard and the severity
of the hazard occurring. We currently use qual-
itative terms to allow prioritisation using terms
such as low, medium and high.
Consequences The potential effects of the hazard
manifesting itself in the wider system.
Recommended Actions The cause(s) of action, ei-
ther mitigation or avoidance, that could be taken
to deal with the situation in question. Whether
a given course of action should be taken is tem-
pered by economic, organisational and political
factors and as such is not explored in more depth
through responsibility modelling. It instead pro-
vides a starting point for further deliberations.
Responsibility models can be used to represent ex-
isting organisational structures where the allocation
of resources and personnel to responsibilities is some-
thing which has already occurred. We also believe that
responsibility models can be used dynamically to rep-
resent evolving situations. For example, a new piece
of equipment is supplied to an agent. In this case risk
clauses are useful to determine not only the effect of
that piece of equipment being used too late, or not
used at all, or used incorrectly etc in the furtherance
of a responsibility; but also whether the relationship
of allocation itself occurs too late or early etc.
Within our models we separate these static and dy-
namic aspects by associating allocation risk clauses
with the relationships, and by associating usage risk
clauses with the entities. The difference between the
use of the same clause on allocation and use is illus-
trated by the following example:
The equipment is allocated too late (a
clause attached to the ‘has’ relationship
between a responsibility/person and a re-
source)
vs
The equipment is used too late (a clause
attached to the ‘resource’ entity for the
equipment in question)
Although both may have the same consequence, ac-
countability could differ. A person cannot be held ac-
countable for a situation where they have been allo-
cated the right equipment too late to make use of it. If
however they already have the right equipment they
may be held accountable for not using it.
5 CASE STUDY
During 2007 our research group acted as observers
for the Scottish Elections accredited by the Electoral
Commission. The 2007 Scottish elections involved
the use of E-Counting, something that had not previ-
ously been attempted in Scotland. E-Counting in this
instance involved the use of paper ballots that were
then machine read, tallied and stored. Parts of the vot-
ing process also used STV, a form of voting where
preferences are assigned numerically against candi-
dates, again for the first time.
The election itself caused considerable embarrass-
ment to the government. Problems emerged with am-
biguities in the new ballot forms; including issues re-
lated to the quality of the printing of ballots, which in
turn led to many problems in the scanning process.
The company responsible for the counting process
had no previous experience of the STV system, and
did not understand the role of the political represen-
tatives at the counts. As such the process that was put
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in place was relatively opaque to political and other
observers, with limited information on the ongoing
count progress provided by LCD screens. The unre-
liability of the update screens themselves was another
cause for embarrassment.
From a socio-technical perspective the election is
interesting as it contained several processes, machines
and people, many of whom had limited training,
which were dealing dealing with new ballots, new
processing, and new tallying mechanisms.
Our accreditation allowed us access to prepara-
tory literature, training materials and briefings prior
to the election, plus access to the polling stations and
counts. We were able to contribute to the discovery of
issues relating to the election (Lock et al. 2008), in-
cluding input to the government Gould Report (Gould
2007). By constructing responsibility models from the
data we had available to us we believe many of the
problems that occurred could have been discovered
and discussed before the event. This section describes
some of the models we have constructed that show
how responsibility modelling could have helped in
collaborative discussions.
One of the issues that faced those working at the
count was related to the E-counting machines them-
selves. The elections used electronic readers to scan
normal paper ballots and automatically determine the
voter’s intentions. Several problems emerged. Figure
2 outlines the responsibilities of three different agents
involved in the counting process.
Firstly, the DRS operators (a largely de-skilled po-
sition), responsible for refilling the hopper with un-
scanned votes and monitoring for problems (most no-
tably paper jams). The diagram uses the ‘allocated to’
arrow to indicate that the DRS operative has access to
a DRS machine to aid them in fulfilling the responsi-
bilities they hold.
Secondly, the DRS technicians who were more
highly skilled, and capable of rectifying problems dis-
covered with the counting machines. The diagram
states that the DRS technician is ‘responsible for’ the
DRS machine. This is shorthand for inserting an ad-
ditional responsibility, of maintaining the resource, to
which the machines would be ‘allocated to’, and the
technician made ‘responsible for’.
Thirdly, the political party officials who were re-
sponsible for estimation. Prior to the 2007 election the
political officials had provided a check against cor-
ruption by performing their own count of votes as the
process went on. In a normal election these unoffi-
cial counters have managed to tally results to within
5-10% and as such provide an important feature of
British elections. The replacement of hand counting
by a DRS counting machine however meant that the
speed of scanning made hand counting impractical.
Interestingly this had not become clear to the politi-
Figure 2: Partial DRS Counting machine responsibil-
ity model
cal officials until the process was actually underway.
The responsibility model would have illustrated the
fact that although the DRS and party officials would
not under normal circumstances meet, they needed to
be aware that they were both trying to operate on the
same resources, albeit from a passive context for the
party officials.
The model produced of these interactions could
have been used to promote discussion of the strat-
egy for dealing with impaired processing speeds of
the counting machines, and the subsequent demands
on the overloaded DRS technicians. Figure 4 shows
some examples of risk clauses derived from this sce-
nario. Notice that the consequence of one given situ-
ation, that of a breakdown (impaired operation) of a
given machine makes calls on another resource, the
DRS technician, who is therefore under greater load.
Figure 3 outlines the adjudication process that
took place on ballots. The adjudication process con-
sisted of those ballots that could not meet the auto-
mated counting systems threshold for decision mak-
ing. First, an adjudication process involving the coun-
cil authority staff dealt with those ballots that were
easily resolvable (denoted as Normal Adjudication
in the diagram). These often included ballots where
stray lines, caused by the scanning of folded paper
produced enough doubt in the system to pass these
to adjudication. Second, the returning officer, and
their deputy returning officers in consultation with the
party officials dealt with those that remained at ‘re-
turning officer adjudication’. This process used a sep-
arate area containing a workstation and accompany-
ing data projector to allow close observation by multi-
ple people. Both adjudication processes used the ‘ad-
judication station’ resources to interface to the ‘Bal-
lot Database’ (denoted as a information resource on
the diagram) which stored information relating to the
stage each ballot in the system had reached.
One of the major issues that would have revealed
with modelling is that the returning officer, and their
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Figure 3: adjudication & database interaction
deputies responsibilities remained broadly the same
between manual and E-count elections, whereas their
workload increased dramatically. Problems related to
folded ballots etc, caused adjudications that the sys-
tem, and the council staff could not deal with alone.
Council staff had no access to the complete ballot,
only to parts of it. Hence lines across the sheet were
difficult to interpret and dismiss. The resultant load on
the returning officers slowed the count in many cases,
and led to returning officers and their deputies need-
ing to frequently address different responsibilities in
different parts of the count halls (including Adjudi-
cation, Supervision and Declaration as indicated on
the diagram). Given the risks associated with intro-
ducing new technology it could have been anticipated
that a heavier than normal load on those in managerial
control would result. A more delegated responsibility
structure would have been considerably more robust.
The responsibility model also illustrates the inabil-
ity of the socio-technical system to deal with prob-
lems caused by the ballot database, which acted as a
single system, integrated into many of the processes
involved in the count. Delays in processing queries
from the adjudication process, and from other pro-
cesses caused by database issues contributed to much
of the inefficiency seen at the counts. At one count
centre problems with the database caused the count to
be closed down temporarily for repairs, reopening the
next day. In this case the processing of large numbers
of adjudications prevented the system from keeping
up with ballot indexing, eventually causing the sys-
tem to crash. Given that the ballot database was a crit-
ical resource relatively little consideration was given
to it in preparatory material or in the discussions on
deployment of the E-Counting system beforehand.
Figure 5 shows a subset of the risk clauses associ-
ated with the returning officer / deputies and the ballot
database. In particular, this example shows the impor-
tance of context to the analysis of risk, as different
levels of failure were observed during the process.
The result of persistent overloading of both return-
ing officer / deputies and the ballot databases shows
that the procedure for dealing with low levels of oc-
currence were not in place, and that nothing could be
done at the time to mitigate the problems caused by
higher levels of occurrence.
Figure 6 shows the risks associated with the pro-
cess of adjudication itself. Both party officials and lo-
cal authority / returning officers had the responsibility
of overseeing the stages of adjudication, but the speed
of adjudication brought on by the introduction of an
electronic system impaired the process. This occurred
as those operating the adjudication terminals became
familiar with the motions they needed to go through.
This led to an increase in speed which led to party offi-
cials lacking the time necessary to consult, or in some
cases even think about given cases. This was com-
pounded by system design decisions which prevented
operators from going back more than one adjudica-
tion to make a change. As the speed of adjudication
ran at around 2 seconds per case party officials often
lost the ability to query decisions before they could
stop the process. As such, the two safety factors in
adjudication, having two operators, and having party
oversight failed due to the unforeseen consequences
of speeding up the process. Throughout the count is-
sues relating to the relegation of political representa-
tives was prevalent, and it was clear that insufficient
consideration had been given to their role at the de-
sign stages.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has proposed a novel approach combin-
ing existing notions of responsibility modelling with
hazard / risk based data to allow improved analysis
of socio-technical systems. In doing so we have a de-
veloped a technique that goes beyond the capabilities
of many of the existing technically focused analysis
techniques, and applied this in a topical case study.
We are currently developing tools to analyse the
data stored by our models. In particular we are in-
terested in highlighting critical entities and relation-
ships. Such an approach could for example provide
visual cuing of the most connected processes, agents
and resources. We believe visualisation of such con-
cepts, in a similar form to that currently performed
within many network analysis tools could be used to
further reinforce the recognition of potential trouble
spots in a model. We are also developing ‘what if’
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Figure 4: DRS machine analysis
Figure 5: adjudication and Database interaction analysis
Figure 6: adjudication oversight analysis
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style capabilities to allow users to simulate responsi-
bility failures and understand the consequences across
a model of a given scenario. Such functionality would
be useful in simulated exercises of the type used in
the civil emergency domain in order to stress plans to
eliminate problems and improve training.
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